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Abstract 
The current study examines the contribution of right-left (or conservative- liberal) ideology 
to voting, as well as the extent to which basic values account for ideological orientation. Analyses 
were conducted in 16 countries from 5 continents (Europe, North-America, South-America, Asia, 
and Oceania), most of which have been neglected by previous studies. Results showed that left-right 
(or liberal-conservative) ideology predicted voting in all countries except Ukraine. Basic values 
exerted a considerable effect in predicting ideology in most countries, especially in established 
democracies like Australia, Finland, Italy, UK, and Germany. Pattern of relations with the whole set 
of ten values revealed that the critical trade-off underlying ideology is between values concerned 
with tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people (universalism) versus values concerned 
with preserving the social order and status quo (security). A noteworthy exception was found in 
European post-communist countries, where relations of values with ideology were small (Poland) or 
near to zero (Ukraine, Slovakia). 
 
Key-words: basic values; ideology; left-right; political orientation; voting 
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Basic values, ideological self-placement, and voting: A cross-cultural study 
The long-term decline of socio-structural factors as shapers of political preference has been 
a striking change for contemporary democracies (Jost, 2006; van der Brug 2010). The appeal of 
party identification has weakened (Dalton 2000). Social class, income, and education account for 
political preference less than in the past. Traditional ideological divisions between right and left (or 
conservative and liberal) appear less marked than in the past as political parties form coalitions and 
endorse political programs that are barely distinctive (Caprara, 2007). At the same time, ideological 
preferences are becoming more dependent upon voter’s personality characteristics, such as traits 
(e.g., Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling & Ha, 2010; Jost, 2006; Schoen & Schumann, 2007; 
Vecchione et al., 2011), and values (e.g., Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione 
& Barbaranelli, 2008; Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan & Shrout, 2007; Vecchione, Caprara, Dentale & 
Schwartz, 2013). 
The above description applies to established Western democracies like United States, United 
Kingdom and Italy. One may wonder whether left-right and liberal-conservative ideological self-
placement hold the same meanings in re-established democracies, like Spain and Chile, and in post-
communist countries, where socialism has recalibrated the ideals of traditional left (Piurko, 
Schwartz & Davidov, 2011). Likewise, one may wonder about the extent to which basic values 
operate as major organizers of ideological self-placement across different countries. The more one 
considers the diversity of people’s living conditions, traditions, habits, ways of thinking and styles 
of relating to each other across the world, the more we are forced to revise the traditional western 
understanding of what really matters in political choices.  
In this spirit, the present contribution aims to examine the extent to which left-right (or 
liberal-conservative) self-placement account for a major portion of voting behavior across 16 
countries from 5 continents (Europe, North-America, South-America, Asia, and Oceania). 
Moreover, it examines the extent to which basic personal values account for ideological self-
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placement across countries that differ significantly in size, economics, religion, political history, 
and culture.  
Ideology 
In political science, ideology has been viewed as an interrelated set of attitudes and beliefs 
about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved (Erikson & Tedin, 2003). Hence, 
ideology includes shared assumptions and beliefs about human nature and society and about ideals 
and priorities to be pursued. Different ideologies may contain competing views about how life 
should be lived and about how society should be governed. When shared by groups of individuals, 
these ideologies provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription for how the 
environment should be structured (Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). They can serve as organizing 
devices to structure political knowledge and expertise, or as broad postures that more or less 
consciously explain and justify different states of social and political affairs (Jost et al., 2009).  
It is still a matter of debate whether a single right- left ideological dimension is sufficient to 
organize citizens’ political knowledge and thought (e.g., Jost et al., 2009). 
Since the time of the French revolution, ideological opinions have been classified most often 
in terms of a single right-left dimension. This dimension largely reflected the divide between 
preferences for stability (the status quo of the ancient regime) vs. change in early usage (Revelli, 
2007). Much of the ideological conflict over change vs. status quo pertained to age-old disputes 
concerning the role of hierarchy, authority and tradition (Kitschelt, 2003). Over time and across 
countries, however, distinctions between right and left have changed. They have come to reflect a 
variety of combinations of ideals that pertain both to the private and public sphere of politics and to 
the social and economic spheres of life.  
Currently, different conceptions of right and left apply in different polities. In established 
democracies like Australia, U.K., and U.S., right and left are often equated with conservative and 
liberal ideologies, respectively. The right is mostly associated with political movements that 
endorse traditional ideals like authority and social order, whereas the left is more often associated 
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with political movements that endorse egalitarian ideals (Bobbio, 1996). Various forms of right and 
left, however, have also included movements that oppose authoritarian regimes and democracy and 
political programs that oppose free market economy and social welfare in various degrees (Giddens, 
1994; Revelli, 2007). As Freeden (2010) noted, ideologies shade off into each other and cut through 
one another. Although most modern democracies have become more egalitarian in terms of civil 
rights and access to health services, education and work opportunities, achieving the optimal 
combination of individual freedom and social justice is an arduous challenge for the left and right in 
most countries. Thus it is sometimes difficult to discern what is common among parties and 
movements that claim to endorse the same ideology. 
Several researchers still wonder whether one dimension is sufficient to illuminate the 
structure of political choices (e.g., Ashton et al., 2005; Heath, Evans, & Martin, 1994; Ricolfi, 
2002). Others have suggested decomposing the left-right distinction into economic and social 
dimensions (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Conceptions of freedom in politics and in economics are 
in fact difficult to reconcile under one left-right dimension in modern democracies. The left is often 
been identified with political programs that limit individuals’ economic freedom but advocate 
maximum freedom in the sphere of civil rights. The right is often identified with political programs 
that curtail citizens’ freedom in the sphere of civil rights but advocate maximum freedom in the 
sphere of economics. 
Nonetheless, the left-right and liberal-conservative distinctions have survived over the 
centuries to map a political space made of ideas and people that occupy opposing positions. These 
distinctions still hold even where opposing political coalitions have adopted more pragmatic 
platforms intended to attract a wide swath of the electorate, platforms that are much less distinctive. 
Likely, the more party coalitions lead to bipolar polities and pose a choice between two major 
options, the more the traditional ideological divide can serve as a knowledge and communication 
device that helps citizens to orient themselves in a complex political universe. 
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Moreover, one should consider that self-placing on the left-right or liberal-conservative 
continuum may have an affective value in itself, as it enables people to make choices that accord 
with their basic dispositions and to sort the political world into “us” and “them” (Jacoby, 2009; 
Sears & Funk, 1999). Self identifying along a unique ideological dimension may satisfy people’s 
needs of social inclusion and belonging, despite the diversity of contents that can be traced to the 
opposite poles of that dimension across polities (Nozick, 1989).  
Based on this reasoning, we posited that the single ideological dimension continues to be an 
important organizer of political thought. We expected that left-right and conservative- liberal 
ideologies are major predictors of political choices across democracies that differ widely in their 
history and degree of establishment. 
Basic Values 
A number of scholars have assigned a central role to values as organizers of political 
preferences and judgments (Knutsen, 1995; Rokeach, 1973, 1979; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, 
Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). Values are cognitive representations of desirable, abstract, trans-
situational goals that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives. They refer to what people 
consider important, and vary in their relative importance as standards for judging behavior, events, 
and people (Schwartz, 1992).  
Although the relationship between values and political orientation has been addressed from 
different perspectives (Braithwaite, 1997; Knutsen, 1995; Rokeach, 1973), most recent studies 
adopt Schwartz’s ten basic personal values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). This theory proposes ten broad, 
motivationally distinct values derived from universal requirements of the human condition: Security, 
power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, 
and conformity. The type of goal or motivation a value expresses distinguishes one value from 
another. As shown in Figure 1, the ten values can be located around a motivational circle. Within 
this circular structure, values that are adjacent (e.g., benevolence and universalism) share similar 
motivational emphases and are positively related. By contrast, values located on opposite sides of 
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the circle (e.g. power and universalism) express conflicting motives and are negatively related 
(Schwartz, 1992, 2005). This structure implies that adjacent values have similar correlations with 
other variables. These correlations should decline in both directions, reaching the most negative 
value in correspondence of opposing values in the circle (see Schwartz, 2006). 
Based on this pattern of conflicts and compatibilities, the ten values can be grouped under 
four broader dimensions: (1) values that emphasize self-enhancement (power and achievement); (2) 
values that emphasize transcending personal interests and promoting the welfare of others 
(universalism and benevolence); (3) values that emphasize conservation of the status quo (security, 
tradition, and conformity); (4) values that emphasize openness to change (self-direction, stimulation, 
and hedonism). 
Using the Schwartz’s taxonomy, several studies have shown that citizens tend to vote for 
parties or coalitions whose policies they perceive as likely to promote or protect their important 
values. A study of the 1988 Israeli elections showed that basic values discriminated significantly 
between voters of different political parties (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). In Italy, voters for the 
centre-right coalition gave higher priority to the self-enhancement and conservation values, whereas 
voters for the centre-left coalition gave higher priority to the self-transcendence values (e.g., 
Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione & Barbaranelli, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2010). 
Other studies have focused on the relation between values and ideological self-placement. 
Using data from the ESS third (2006-2007) round of the European Social Survey (ESS), Piurko et al. 
(2011) found that self-enhancement and conservation values explained a right orientation, whereas 
self-transcendence and openness to change values explained a left orientation. They also found that 
values had greater explanatory power in countries with a long tradition of liberal democracy, like 
Germany and the UK, than in post-communist countries. 
Aspelund et al. (2013) analyzed data from 28 European countries using data from the third 
(2006-2007) and fourth (2008-2009) rounds of the ESS. They found that conservation vs. openness 
to change was significantly related to right-wing orientation in almost all Western countries. 
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Relationships in Central and Eastern European countries, by contrast, were much less consistent. 
Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence was significantly related to right-wing orientation in the 
vast majority of Western European countries, although more weakly than conservation values. Few 
correlations were found to be significant among Central and Eastern European countries. 
The present research 
The current study examines the extent to which personal values account for left-right (or 
liberal-conservative) ideological self-placement in 16 countries from 5 continents (Europe, North-
America, South-America, Asia, and Oceania). It extends prior research on links between values and 
ideology in Europe (Aspelund et al., 2013; Piurko et al., 2011; Thorisdottir et al., 2007) by 
considering non-European countries that previous works have often neglected. We include 
established democracies (Australia, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and 
the United States), countries in which democracy has been re-established after a more or less 
prolonged interval of authoritarian regimes (Brazil, Chile, Greece, Spain, Turkey), and post-
communist countries (Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine).  
Moreover, the present study measures values with the full 40-item PVQ, which allows 
assessing the ten basic personal values with adequate reliability, and examining their relations with 
ideological self-placement. It complements and extends earlier cross-cultural studies, which relied 
on the PVQ-21.  
We examined the pattern of relations of the whole set of values with ideological self-
placement. Right and conservative ideologies of most countries emphasize security, limited 
government, and traditional family and national values. Such policy is compatible with and may 
express the motivational goals of security and tradition values. Left and liberal ideologies, in 
contrast, emphasize the merits of the welfare state, express strong concern for social justice, 
tolerance of diverse groups (even those that might disturb the conventional social order), and 
emphasize pluralism and equality (Bobbio, 1996). The expected consequences of such a policy are 
compatible with universalism values.  
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We therefore expect that ideological self-placement on the left/right and the liberal-
conservative scales correlate most positively with universalism values and most negatively with 
security and tradition values. The circular motivational structure of the ten values implies that 
correlations would decline from universalism to security and tradition in both directions around the 
circle. 
While this is the expected pattern, a certain degree of variability in the strength of the 
relationships is to be expected. As argued by Barnea and Schwartz (1998) the predictive validity of 
particular values may vary as a function of the ideological content of the political discourse. 
Moreover, in keeping with previous results (Aspelund et al, 2013; Piurko et al., 2011), we expect 
that the contribution of basic values to ideological self-placement is stronger in established 
democracies than in post-communist societies. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedures 
This study involved 16 countries. Data from 15 countries (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the 
United States) were available from a cross-cultural project aimed at investigating the role of values 
in shaping political preferences (Schwartz et al., 2013; Vecchione et al., 2015). We performed 
secondary analysis of data in these countries. Additional data have been collected in Japan. This 
allowed us to extend the generalizability of results to an Asiatic country.  
As described in Schwartz et al. (2013), a representative national sample was obtained in 
Germany and Turkey. Researchers from other countries enlisted university students to gather the 
data. The same instructions for administering the instruments were used in all countries. Table 1 
presents the characteristics of the samples.  
Measures 
Ideology. Ideology was measured in each country through two distinct indicators. The first 
was a self-placement item on the liberal-conservative scale: “In political matters, people sometimes 
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talk about conservatives and liberals. How would you place your views on this scale, generally 
speaking?”. Alternatives ranged from 1 (Extremely liberal) to 7 (Extremely conservative). The 
second was a self-placement item on the left-right scale: “In political matters, people sometimes 
talk about and “the left” and "the right" How would you place your views on this scale, generally 
speaking?” Alternatives ranged from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right). We used the liberal-conservative scale 
in the U.K. and the U.S., and the left-right scale in all other countries. This decision was based on 
input from the country collaborators about the common usage in their country. The left-right item 
was rescaled to a 7-point scale, have the same range of the liberal-conservative scale.  
Voting. We measured political choice directly by asking participants which party they had 
voted for in the most recent national election. We included parties with at least 25 voters in the 
analysis. To maximize the number of cases in the analysis, researchers in nine out of sixteen 
countries combined small parties (n < 25) with larger parties or with one another, based on the 
similarity of their ideological orientations. Voting was coded as an ordered categorical variable, by 
positioning political parties along the left-right continuum. The number of categories varied across 
nations, from two (U.S.) to six (Israel), depending on the number of political parties that were 
considered.  
Values. The PVQ (Schwartz, 2005) measured basic values. It includes 40 short verbal 
portraits of different people matched to the respondents’ gender, each describing a person’s goals, 
aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example, “Thinking up 
new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way” 
describes a person who holds self-direction values important. Three to six items measure each value. 
For each portrait, respondents indicate how similar the person is to themselves on a scale ranging 
from “not like me at all” to “very much like me.” We infer respondents’ own values from the 
implicit values of the people they consider similar to themselves. In the current study, Cronbach’s 




Ideological self-placement and voting  
 The left panel of Table 2 reports country means and standard deviations for the left-right and 
the liberal-conservative scales. Participants with missing data on ideological self-placement (3.6% 
of the total sample) were excluded from the analysis.1 The mean of left-right ideology ranged across 
countries from 3.38 (Australia) to 6.23 (Poland). The mean score of liberal-conservative self-
placement was 3.12 in the UK, and 3.90 in the US. The right panel of Table 2 reports Spearman's 
correlations of ideological self-placement with voting. Correlations were significant in all countries 
except Ukraine. The preference for a left-wing (or liberal) ideology was consistently associated with 
voting for left-wing parties. According to Cohen's (1988) standards, correlations were large in 
Australia, Brazil, Finland, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United States, 
moderate in Chile, Poland, Slovakia, and United Kingdom, and small in Japan. 
The contribution of basic values to ideological self-placement 
We used a multilevel regression analysis to investigate the unique contribution of the ten 
values to ideology in the overall sample, controlling for basic socio-demographic variables (gender, 
age, income, and education). This approach, often referred to as random coefficient model (Kreft & 
De Leeuw, 1998), takes into account the nested nature of the data (individuals are nested within 
countries). It permits examining the effect of individual-level variables on ideological self-
placement, without incurring problems typically associated with the use of ordinary least squares 
regression with nested data. It also allows examining whether these effects vary significantly across 
countries. 
In a first step we estimated an empty model, which only includes the intercept. This model 
was estimated to calculate the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) of ideological self-placement. 
                                                 
1 The percentage of missing cases for each country were: 0.0% in Australia, 1.7% in Brazil, 3.6% in Chile, 
2.0% in Finland, 8.8% in Germany, 1.1% in Greece, 1.7% in Israel, 4.8% in Italy, 8.5% in Japan, 3.1% in 
Poland, 2.1% in Slovakia, 2.1% in Spain, 6.0% in Turkey, 0.0% in Ukraine, 0.0% in the United Kingdom, 
and 6.4% in the United States. 
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The ICC was .08, indicating that 8% of the total variance in ideology was accounted for by 
differences between countries.  
We then estimated a random-intercept model, which adds level-1 explanatory variables (i.e., 
basic personal values and socio-demographic variables). We centered the ten values and the 
continuous demographic variables on their group mean. Gender was coded as 0 (female) and 1 
(male). Results showed that the three conservation values (security, b = .16, p<.001, tradition b 
= .10, p<.001, and conformity b = .10, p<.001), predicted a preference for right/conservative 
ideology (a higher score on the scale). Power (b = .05, p<.01) and stimulation (b = .05, p<.01) were 
also related to a preference for right/conservative ideology, although to a lesser extent. 
Universalism (b = -.31, p<.001) and hedonism (b = -.07, p<.01) predicted a preference for 
left/liberal ideology (a lower score on the scale). Among the demographics, education (b = -.01, 
p.<05), and income (b = -.06, p<.01) predicted a preference for left/liberal ideology.  
Figure 2 reports full set of unstandardized regression coefficients for personal values. As can 
be observed, the coefficients followed the motivational circle of values, declining from security to 
universalism in both directions. All these relationships, except for in the case of universalism, were 
quite weak. This figure, however, reflects the overall effects on ideology across the sixteen samples. 
Allowing the relationship between ideology and values to vary across countries we found that the 
effects of five values (conformity, security, tradition, universalism, and power) varied significantly 
(p<.01). This suggests that the same pattern cannot be generalized to all countries. We therefore 
performed separate analyses for each sample, using OLS multiple regression. 
Table 3 presents the unique contribution of values to ideological self-placement in each 
country, controlling for the effect of the demographic variables. Given the high number of tests 
being performed, we applied a Bonferroni correction to determine whether each of the ten 
regression coefficient was significant in each country (i.e., the critical level of significance was set 
at .01). We found that universalism values predicted a preference for left/liberal ideology in all 
countries, except Ukraine and Slovakia. Security, tradition, and conformity values predicted a 
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preference for right/conservative ideology in most countries. The effects of the other values were 
weaker and much less consistent across countries.  
To evaluate the degree of deviation from the overall pattern, we calculated the Pearson’s 
correlation between the ten regression coefficients derived from aggregated data and the regression 
coefficients estimated in each country.2 Pearson’s r was higher than .80 (p<.05) in 13 of 16 
countries, revealing a substantial homogeneity in the effect that values exerted on ideology (Table 3, 
last column). In the post-communist countries, by contrast, Pearson’s r was considerably lower and 
not significant.3  
The incremental contribution of basic values, after controlling for the effect of the 
demographics, was substantial in most samples. In Western and Southern European countries, the 
R-squared ranged from .18 (Germany) to .32 (Finland). A similar effect was found in non-European 
countries, where the R-squared varied between .12 (Japan) and .26 (Australia). The smallest 
contribution was observed in the three Post-communist countries, where the R-squared ranged 
from .05 (Slovakia) to .09 (Poland).  
Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the association between ideological self-placement 
and voting, as well as pattern of relations between Schwartz’s basic personal values and ideological 
self-placement across 16 countries that differ widely in their traditions, cultural and historical roots. 
Ideology is the strongest predictor of voting in all countries, except for Ukraine. The highest 
correlations (.70 or higher) were observed in Chile, East Germany, Israel, Italy, and Spain, where 
ideological self-placement serves as a virtual proxy for voting choice. This pattern of results 
suggests that claims of the end of ideology and the decline of the right and left divide have been 
prematurely announced, as already noted by Jost (2006). Although the underlying principles are 
                                                 
2 To avoid inflated coefficients, Pearson's correlations for each country were based on aggregate data from 
which the examined country was excluded. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this procedure.  
3 Preliminary analysis showed that multicollinearity diagnostics were in the acceptable range (VIF values 
were higher than .8 in each country, which is far above the acceptable limit of .1, see Cohen, Cohen & Aiken, 
2003). 
 14 
complex and difficult to grasp, the traditional left-right distinction still serves as useful heuristic 
device that helps voters to organize political knowledge, to assess political programs, to structure 
their judgments and to make their choices (Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). Likely right and left 
are ideological labels that have an intrinsic value, even if they do not always share the same 
meanings and carry the same priorities across different polities. Yet, they may act as attractors that, 
at collective level, enable people to take position with others and to strengthen consensus. 
This occurs in established democracies where citizens are accustomed to voting as an act 
that is both symbolic and expressive and that goes beyond contingent interests. People vote despite 
being aware their single vote is almost irrelevant with respect to the final outcome of an election.  
People vote regardless of their position in society as voting attest to the personal and social identity 
they cherish, to their being persons worthy of respect, to the equal dignity of their views as citizens, 
and to their belongingness and inclusiveness (Caprara, 2008). In this regard, ideology is the device 
that allows people to cope with complexity and that meet the two fundamental needs of human 
existence, agency and communion, namely the needs to exert one’s own will and to feel part of a 
community. 
The power of ideology in accounting for voting holds also in post-communist societies, like 
Poland and Slovakia, although to a lesser extent. In these countries, the demise of socialist ideals 
has carried tremendous changes in the political landscape. Ukraine constituted the only country that 
showed no relation between ideology and voting. One may speculate about the different historical 
vicissitudes and political traditions of this country, which may account for its being an outlier, even 
with regard to Poland and Slovakia.  
The pattern of relationship of ideological self-placement with basic values revealed that the 
critical trade-off underlying ideology is between values concerned with tolerance and protection for 
the welfare of all people (universalism) versus values concerned with preserving the social order 
and status quo (security). 
Universalism and security are located on opposite sides of the motivational circle of values 
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(Schwartz, 1992), as they express conflicting motivations, that seems to correspond closely to 
liberalism and social welfare vs. social conservatism. Universalism values call for promoting the 
welfare of others even at cost to the self. Moreover, they express concern for the weak, those most 
likely to suffer from market-driven policies. Security values emphasize preserving the social order. 
The trade-off between these two values seems to capture particularly well the ideological divide in 
most countries (e.g., Braithwaite, 1997; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003). 
It is remarkable that similar results hold across countries, despite the different trajectories to 
democracy and the diversities of contents that can be traced under the same ideological labels. A 
notable exception was found in post-communist countries, especially in Ukraine and Slovakia, 
where relations of values with ideology were near to zero. In this regard, one may speculate about 
the different historical vicissitudes and political traditions of these countries, even with regard to 
other post-communist countries, like Poland. It is possible that the experience of communism in 
these countries has erased memories of past democratic regimes, and that the profound changes 
following its collapse resulted in confusion about the definition of left and right. Future studies 
should further investigate the extent to which past and contingent ideological forces impinge on 
voting among post-communist countries whose transition to democratic institutions is still far from 
being fully achieved. 
When interpreting the results of this study, potential limitations should be considered, 
attributable to sampling or methodological artifacts. A first limitation is that participants were from 
convenience samples, except for in Germany and Turkey. Thus one can’t generalize our findings to 
the entire countries population. For example, participants included in our samples of convenience 
were more educated, wealthier, and urban than the general population. Yet, the patterns of findings 
in national samples were largely consistent with those from samples of convenience. Moreover, we 
cannot exclude that differences across countries in the strength of the effects was due, at least in 
part, by differences in the reliability of the measures. A further limitation is the limited number of 
countries, which did not allow us to investigate the role of cultural level variables in moderating the 
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strength of the relations between values and ideology. Future studies, using a higher number of 
representative samples from over the world, are needed to investigate the role of different country-
level variables, such as economic development of the country, level of democratization, type and 
importance of religion (for a similar approach, see for instance, Bond et al., 2004).  
Despite the above limitations, we believe that this study is informative regarding the 
relationship among basic values, ideological orientation, and voting in a variety of representative 
democracies. The relatively consistent pattern of covariation between these variables suggests that 
political ideology has a common core of meaning, despite the diversity of left/liberal and 
right/conservative policies across countries.  
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Table 1. Description of the samples. 
 
Country N % Female Mean age 
(SD)  
Mean years of 
education (SD) a 
Median household 
income b 
Australia 285 54% 36.1 (13.9) 16.6 (3.6) 3 
Brazil 995 56% 34.1 (9.0) 19.1 (4.1) 2 
Chile 415 50% 43.3 (13.4) 15.8 (4.2) 3 
Finland 428 68% 40.1 (13.2) 16.2 (4.3) 4 
Germany 1066 46% 53.7 (16.4) 14.6 (4.4) 4 
Greece 374 48% 41.9 (12.0) 15.3 (3.5) 3 
Israel 478 57% 38.6 (12.7) 15.6 (3.0) 4 
Italy 557 56% 38.7 (13.9) 15.3 (3.7) 4 
Japan 364 54% 44.6 (13.9) 14.5 (2.5) 3 
Poland 699 56% 36.6 (13.0) 15.1 (3.0) 4 
Slovakia 485 51% 47.7 (14.6) 14.4 (3.3) 5 
Spain 420 54% 37.7 (14.8) 14.3 (3.1) 4 
Turkey 512 46% 37.7 (13.2) 11.4 (3.3) 5 
Ukraine 735 48% 41.1 (12.6) 14.0 (3.3) 4 
United Kingdom 469 64% 36.7 (12.1) 14.2 (2.9) 2 
United States 543 56% 32.6 (14.4) 14.0 (2.2) 4 
Notes. a Include compulsory years of schooling; b Income was measured with the following 
scale: 1=very much above the average of your country, 2=above the average, 3=a little above 
average, 4=about average, 5=a little below the average, 6=below the average, 7=very much 
below the average. 
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Table 2. Ideological self-placement: Means and standard deviations, and 
correlations with voting. 
Country Mean (SD)  Pearson's r with voting 
Australia 3.38 (1.54)  .56** 
Chile 4.98 (2.14)  .48** 
Brazil 4.62 (1.88)  .70** 
Finland 5.11 (2.17)  .67** 
Germany 4.66 (1.67)  .64** 
Greece 4.46 (2.00)  .61** 
Israel 5.11 (2.40)  .80** 
Italy 4.93 (2.56)  .74** 
Japan 5.44 (1.36)  .16* 
Poland 6.23 (2.25)  .49** 
Slovakia 5.47 (2.03)  .39** 
Spain 4.68 (2.37)  .75** 
Turkey 5.64 (2.49)  .60** 
Ukraine 5.31 (1.67)  -.01 
United Kingdom 3.12 (1.38)  .42** 
United States  3.90 (1.32)  .54** 
Notes. * p < .01; ** p < .001. We used the liberal-conservative scale in the 
U.K. and the U.S., and the left-right scale in the other countries. Higher 




Table 3. Standardized OLS regression coefficients relating basic values to ideological self-placement. 
 SE CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO  R2  Similarity with 
the overall pattern 
Australia .23** .07 .14 .03 -.24** -.10 .16 -.15 -.01 .18*  .26  .86** 
Brazil .16** .12** .12** .04 -.32** -.03 .02 -.09 .05 .10*  .17  .93** 
Chile .14 .22** .00 .06 -.30** .07 .02 .03 -.07 .09  .20  . 71 ** 
Finland .25** .19** .02 .06 -.41** .02 .15** -.09 .02 .06  .32  .84** 
Germany .24** .04 .25** -.05 -.32** .07 .07 -.06 -.09 .03  .18  . 95 ** 
Greece .20** -.05 .31** -.02 -.37** .06 .00 .05 .08 .02  .29  .86** 
Israel .22** -.02 .42** -.01 -.31** .05 .11 -.03 -.04 .03  .31  . 90** 
Italy .23** .07 .14** .05 -.38** .04 -.09 .00 .11 .10  .27  . 83 ** 
Japan .24** .04 .19** .00 -.24** -.11 .10 -.10 .00 .05  .12  .92** 
Poland .12* -.09 .24** .02 -.15* .13 .02 -.09 -.01 -.13  .09  .62* 
Slovakia -.10 -.09 .04 .09 -.01 -.03 .03 -.11 -.04 .06  .05  .04 
Spain .05 .18* .15 .09 -.32** -.10 .12 -.01 -.10 .11  .22  .83** 
Turkey .12 .00 .19** -.03 -.17** -.11 .02 -.06 -.07 .07  .13  .88** 
U.K. .23** .03 .24** -.03 -.35** -.08 .06 -.06 .01 .09  .30  . 98 ** 
Ukraine .01 .04 .10* -.11* .01 .08 .17** -.03 -.03 -.03  .06  .24 
U.S. .03 .14 .22** .08 -.29** -.06 .10 -.03 -.01 .02  .16  .88** 
Notes. *p<.01; **p<.001; SE = Security; CO = Conformity; TR = Tradition; BE = Benevolence; UN = Universalism; SD = 










Figure 1. Schwartz’s (1992) circular model of values. 
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Figure 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients relating basic values to ideology in a 
multilevel analysis (positive coefficients signify that a value is related to a preference for a 
right/conservative ideology, and vice versa). 
Sec= security; con = conformity; tra = tradition; ben = benevolence; uni = universalism; sdi = 
self-direction; sti = stimulation; hed = hedonism; ach = achievement; pow = power. 
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Appendix. Political parties, ordered from left to right, and number of voters for each. 
Country N Parties 
Australia 252 Greens (n=67); Labor Party (n=115); Liberal and Nationals combined (n=70). 
 
Brazil 693 Partito dos Trabalhadores (PT) and Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 
combined (n=447); Partido Democràtico Trabalhista (PDT) (n=44); Partido da 
Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) (n=174); Partido do Movimento 
Democràtico Brasileiro (PMDB) and Partido Progressista (PP) combined (n=28). 
 
Finland 368 Left Alliance, Green League, and Social Democratic Party combined (n=226); 
Centre party (n=45); Christian Democrats, Swedish Peoples party, National 
Coalition party, and Basic Finnish party combined (n=97). 
 
Chile 266 Partido Por la Democracia (PPD) (n=45); Partido Socialista (PS) (n=30); 
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) (n=55); Renovación Nacional (RN) 
(n=103); Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) (n=33). 
 
Germany 795 Die Linke (n=43); Alliance '90/The Greens (n=130); Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) (n=255); CDU/CSU (n=306); Free Democratic Party (FDP) (n=61). 
  
Greece 263 K.K.E. (n=29); SYRIZA (n=40); Greens (n=25); PASOK (n=124); New 
Democracy (n=45). 
 
Israel 362 Meretz – the new movement (n=56); Avoda-Meimad (n=73); Kadima (n=93); 
Likud (n=81); HaBa'it Hayehudi - Ichud Leumi, Shas, and Yahadut Ha’Torah 
combined (Religious-Mafdal, n=32); Israel Bei'tenu (n=27). 
 
Italy 479 The Italian Marxist and Leninist Party, Workers’ Communist Party, the Italian 
Communist Party, Rainbow Left and the Greens combined (n=32); Democratic 
Party (n=226); Italy of Values (n=40); UdC, UDEUR, and La Rosa Bianca 
combined (n=25); People of Freedom Party (n=136), the Movement for the 
Autonomy, and Northeast League combined (n=156). 
 
Japan  227 The Democratic Party, Japan Restoration Party, and Social Democratic Party 
combined (n=49); The Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeiro, and Your Party 
combined (n=178). 
 
Poland 548 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (n=59); Samoobrona and Polish People's Party 
(PSL) combined (n=27); Civic Platform (PO) (n=318); Law and Justice (Pis) 
(n=144). 
 
Slovakia 407 KSS, SMER, S.O.S., SDL, and ZRS combined (The Left, n=171); SLS, SNS, and 
National/Ethnic combined (n=82); HZD, KDH, LS-HZDS, OKS, and SKDÚ-DS 
combined (Conservative Right, n=154). 
 
Spain 292 United Left (UI) (n=44); Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) (n=127); 









Turkey 312 Republican People's Party (CHP) (n=99); Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
(n=184); Motherland Party (ANAP), Democratic Party (DP), Young Party (GP), 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and Felicity Party (SP) combined (Other 
right-wing, n=29). 
 
Ukraine 541 Party of Regions (n=89); Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (n=225); Lytvyn's Bloc 
(n=27); Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc (n=200). 
 
U.K. 284 Liberal Democrats (n=72); Labour (n=154); Conservatives (n=58). 
 
U.S. 317 Democratic (n=210); Republican (n=107). 
 
  
 
